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 multinomial ordered probit model is used to predict post-release performance in a sample of 
Queensland prisoners released between January 1992 and December 1994. Post-release 
performance is defined in terms of the seriousness of parole breaches and/or reoffences over 
the length of the parole period or until April 1996. The paper examines the statistical significance of 
a number of custodial and socioeconomic variables on the likelihood of a parole breach or re-
offence. Factors analysed include family composition, age, occupation, ethnicity, the number of 
events in custody, the number of prison violations and the length of sentence of the most recent 
custodial episode. All other things being equal, the marginal effects of readmission with respect to 
the set of explanatory variables varies markedly according to whether readmission is through a 
parole breach or through actual recidivist behaviour. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n Australia, as in most developed countries, prison populations are rapidly expanding. For 
instance, in Queensland [Australia’s third most populous state and, based “…on present trends, 
soon to have the highest imprisonment rate of any State in Australia” (Criminal Justice 
Commission, 1998, p. 1)] the number of court appearances resulting in imprisonment (including 
fully or partly suspended sentences) rose from 46 to 50 percent between 1992/93 and 1996/97 (57 to 
64 percent for personal offences and 38 to 41 percent for property offences). This increase in the 
imprisonment rate has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of sentenced offenders actually 
admitted to prison with admissions growing by 98 percent over this period and a further 17 percent 
in the twelve months to 31 March 1998. By March 1998 the Queensland prison system was at 
approximately 132 percent of capacity.  
These figures are interesting in that imprisonment rates have generally not been matched by trends 
in the rate of offences across many categories of recorded crime in Queensland. For example, the 
overall rate of recorded ‘offences against the person’ (including serious assaults, robbery offences, 
murder, and reported and attempted rapes) has been basically stable since 1993/94, and the rate of 
recorded ‘offences against property’ (break and enter, stealing, and motor vehicle offences) has 
increased only slightly (CJC, 1998, p. 2). The remaining broad category of recorded crime, namely 
‘other offences’ has continued to increase, though it is argued that “…this may reflect greater law 
enforcement activity by police, rather than an increase in offending”. Within this category, the rate 
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of recorded ‘drug offences’ rose by 5.4 percent (largely possession of drugs and/or items for use in 
consuming drugs, with cannabis typically being the drug seized by police), with the rate of ‘good 
order offences’ (resisting/hindering police, disorderly conduct, and language offences) remaining 
stable.   
At the same time, the Queensland imprisonment rate (excluding partly or fully suspended 
sentences) has also risen despite a number of procedures aimed at reducing the prison population. 
For example, the number of suspended sentences imposed has either remained stable or slightly 
decreased, with 1996/97 figures suggesting that an additional 200 to 250 people are sent to prison 
by higher courts through a declining trend in the use of this option by the higher courts. Likewise, 
community custody facilities (including home detention) are still being under-utilised and parole 
has been increasingly denied beyond eligibility dates for community release (CJC, 1998, p. 13). 
Furthermore, from this relatively smaller set of paroled prisoners the number of offenders admitted 
to prison after revocation of ‘intervention-type orders’ (including home detention, parole, and 
probation) has continued to grow and has added to the burgeoning prison population. For example, 
and as noted earlier, appearances for ‘other offences’ have primarily accounted for the growth in the 
imprisonment rate, and of this a major component has been ‘enforcement of order’ appearances 
(including breaches of home detention, leave of absence, probation or recognisance, and parole).   
Australia’s increasing imprisonment rate, the growth of ‘enforcement of order’ appearances and the 
declining use of community release touch on two important aspects of the economics of prisons 
literature [see, for example, Buchanan and Hartley (1992), DiIulio (1996) and Avio (1998)]. The 
first aspect is that serving time in prison, as well as participating in various prison and post-release 
programs, may have either positive or negative effects upon the activities of released prisoners 
(Avio, 1998, p. 154). The obvious focus is the rate of criminal recidivism (a variously defined 
measure relating to the criminal activity of released inmates). Avio (1998, p. 154) argues that 
“nailing down the specifics of the relationships is clearly an important factor in evaluating overall 
social policies towards crime as well as in evaluating specific programs for incarcerated and paroled 
offenders”.  
This objective is particularly important in that prison overcrowding has been recognised by 
Queensland’s Criminal Justice Commission (1998, p. 14) as a likely contributor to “an increase in 
the number of reported assaults by prisoners on other prisoners”. Other matters include an increase 
in the number of deaths in prison custody, and the fact that prisoners are generally spending longer 
periods of time in secure custody. Economic models of recidivist behaviour to examine these social 
issues are now relatively commonplace, and the empirical analyses of this economic approach to 
prisons proceeds apace [see, for instance, Schmidt and Witte (1989), Kim (1993), Lattimore et al. 
(1995) and Benda and Tollett (1999)]. There is an obvious need to quantify the impact of these 
custodial and traditional socio-economic characteristics on criminal recidivism in Australia.  
Unfortunately, “there have been few attempts to empirically test the economic model [of crime] 
using Australian data” (Smyth, 1997). However, those studies that do exist throw at least some light 
on the broad issue of criminal deterrence, and the much narrower concern of criminal recidivism, 
within an Australian context. Withers (1984), for example, used pooled time-series, cross-sectional 
state-level data to measure the deterrence and incapacitation effect of imprisonment. Withers (1984) 
concluded that the committal and imprisonment rate were the most reliable determinants of 
variation in crime, and that pecuniary and attitudinal variables (including unemployment and 
education) were either statistically insignificant or highly sensitive to the specification of included 
variables.  
Bodman and Maultby (1997) likewise estimated an aggregate ‘supply-of-offences’ equation where 
the crime rate was related to a number of explanatory variables (including economic, demographic 
and socio-economic factors) representing the costs and benefits of criminal behaviour. While 
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Bodman and Maultby (1997, p. 896) concluded that the results offered significant support for the 
economic theory of crime, they also observed: 
It is clear that the data which are currently available to perform a rigorous economic analysis 
of crime are clearly inadequate. Disaggregated data over an extended time period would 
facilitate a more robust and satisfactory statistical analysis of the economic and social 
determinants of crime, including the relationships between changes in the income 
distribution and crime and the time series dynamics underlying the relationship between 
unemployment and crime.    
Smyth (1995) also tested the economic model of crime using aggregate data, though unlike the 
state-level data of Withers (1984) and Bodman and Maultby (1997), this was based on statistical 
divisions for New South Wales and subdivisions for Sydney. The results suggested “…contra to 
Withers, that neither deterrence nor pecuniary and attitudinal variables are, on their own, good 
indicators of variations in the crime rate” (Smyth, 1997, p. 87). Finally, Torre and Hazari (1999) 
examined court delays from an economic, rather than a legal, perspective. They found that the 
behaviour of the defendant regarding the choice of plea (and regarding the prosecutor’s offer) 
depended on the expected cost function as derived from the expected value framework. 
The second aspect concerning the economics of crime literature is that the difficulty of prisoners in 
obtaining release through stricter early release guidelines, and the dramatic increase in the rate at 
which such community correction orders are revoked, suggests an opening for the economic 
analysis of the parole function in Australian prisons. In general, parole is argued to reduce “social 
costs by prompting prison inmates to behave and by decreasing the number of person-days of 
incarceration supplied. On the other hand, a system utilising parole and/or probation reduces the 
costs of crime to potential offenders and reduces the incapacitation effect” (Avio, 1998, p. 145). An 
efficient punishment system would attempt to balance these costs and benefits and an emerging 
literature exists on the rate at which released offenders return to crime while on parole [see, for 
example, Miceli (1994) and Garoupa (1997)].  
However, in contrast to the analysis of recidivism in the strictest sense (where released prisoners are 
readmitted on the basis of a return to criminal activity) hypotheses linking the custodial and socio-
economic characteristics of parolees to readmittance through often relatively minor breaches of 
parole conditions are relatively underdeveloped. There is an obvious need to investigate economic 
models of recidivism within the context of a judicial system (such as Australia) that relies heavily 
on parole, and to simultaneously address the impact of parole orders on the likelihood of a return to 
criminal activity. The only study known to examine the economic aspects of the parole decision in 
the Australian context was undertaken by Lewis (1983) using NSW offender-level data. Lewis 
(1983) used simulations to estimate the optimal amount of time specified in the parole decision such 
that the total societal costs of property crime were minimised. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the present paper is to investigate the role of both custodial and socio-
economic characteristics in determining the rate of recidivism in paroled Australian prisoners. The 
paper itself is divided into four main parts. The first section outlines the models for the analysis of 
recidivism and readmittance to custody through parole violations for Queensland prisoners. The 
second section discusses the custodial and socio-economic characteristics thought to explain 
recidivist behaviour. The results of the analysis are examined in the third section. The paper ends 
with some brief concluding remarks. 
II. DATA AND MODEL ESTIMATION 
The economic theory of crime is based upon the assumption that most criminals are rational agents 
and that the amount of crime (and the return criminals can expect to receive) is determined by the 
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balance between the expected marginal costs and benefits of criminal activity. The decision whether 
to undertake criminal activity is thus made taking into account the costs and benefits of alternative 
forms of action. From the individual’s perspective, the costs of criminal activity increase with 
increases in the probability of capture and through increases in penalties (the deterrence effect). 
However, the modern economic theory of crime also focuses on the impact of a broad range of 
economic, demographic and socio-economic factors that further modify the costs and benefits of 
criminal (and non-criminal) activity (largely pecuniary and attitudinal effects).  
Within this general framework, it is thought that released prisoners are subject to four additional 
factors that influence the level of future criminal activity (recidivism), both relative to other 
prisoners and the overall population. First, the probability of capture and conviction (through 
existing criminal records) and the expected size of the penalty for future criminal activity are likely 
to be higher for released prisoners than for the population at large. This would serve to increase the 
deterrent effect for released prisoners. Second, economic theory suggests that remissions and other 
forms of early release (such as parole), reduce the deterrent effect of punishment by making prison 
sentences more tolerable (Buchanan and Hartley, 1992).  
Third, there “…is the possible effect of prison in ‘educating’ the criminal into more effective 
methods of committing crime and introducing him to other criminals who might help him in future 
criminal activity after release” (Buchanan and Hartley, 1992, p. 30). Prisons as ‘schools’ for future 
criminal activity would tend to reduce the probability of capture and increase the returns to criminal 
activity. Finally, there is possibility that imprisonment may have assisted in the reform process and 
those prisoners who have gained early release through good behaviour are less likely to engage in 
future criminal activity relative to those that served their full sentence (Lewis, 1983). Unfortunately, 
there is no established theoretical model of recidivism that incorporates these effects. Accordingly, 
the following analysis relies upon explanatory factors that have been specified by similar overseas 
research. 
The data used in this study is extracted from the Queensland Corrective Services Commission 
(QCSC) records of six hundred and twenty inmates paroled between January 1992 and December 
1994. The use of individual-level data is thought to be an advance over previous work in this area 
using aggregated data. More particularly, quite apart from the standard problems of aggregation and 
the fact that the economic model of crime is only theoretically sound at the individual level, the 
primary focus of studies of this type is invariably on predictions for individual behaviour. The data 
is composed of three sets of information. The first set consists of parolee socio-economic 
characteristics (at time of incarceration). Characteristics recorded include ethnic background, age, 
number of children on admission of custody, educational level, and employment and marital status. 
The second set of information relates to parolee ‘custodial’ characteristics. Information collected 
includes the number of previous custodial episodes, years spent in custody and prisoner occupation 
(if any) during the current episode, the number of separate prisons and prison violations during the 
current episode, the security level of the prison of release, and the parole period served.  
The final set of information relates to the post-release ‘performance’ of paroled prisoners. The 
observation period in which performance is assessed is either the length of the parole period or the 
length of time from release until April 1996. Post-release performance (PRP) itself is defined in 
terms of the seriousness of parole breaches and/or re-offences, if any, during the observation period. 
Parolees are categorised as either (number of cases and percentage of sample in brackets): (i) 
inmates who have neither breached parole nor re-offended during the observation period (PRP = 0) 
(360/58.06); (ii) inmates who have violated or breached their conditions of parole and been re-
admitted to custody (PRP = 1) (183/29.52); and (iii) inmates who have committed another criminal 
offence while on parole and been re-admitted to custody (PRP = 2) (77/12.42).  
Categorising post-release performance on this basis is thought to recognise the differing behaviour 
of paroled prisoners. Three courses of action are possible. First, there is the large group of prisoners 
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who have neither breached parole nor re-offended during the observation period. Important 
qualifications are that undetected parole breaches or criminal activity may have occurred during, or 
future parole breaches or criminal activity could occur after, the observation period. Second, 
paroled prisoners may have committed a serious breach of parole conditions thereby entailing a 
return to custody and the requirement to serve the remainder of their sentence. Parole conditions can 
include the requirement “…to report periodically to a parole officer, to gain permission to travel 
interstate and to refrain from the use of alcohol and drugs” (Lewis, 1983, p. 261). It is thought that 
categorising paroled prisoners as ‘parole violators’ may highlight some of the specific factors that 
contribute to prisoners not meeting their parole conditions. These are posited to differ substantially 
from those associated with recidivism and to be leading indicator of a return to criminal activity. 
Finally, there is the category of paroled prisoners who have committed additional criminal activity 
since release. This category of paroled prisoners is regraded as recidivist in the truest sense.     
The analytical technique employed in the present study is to specify post-release performance as the 
dependent variable (y) in a regression with parolee socio-economic and custodial characteristics as 
explanatory variables (x). Caulkins et al. (1996) and Benda (1999) also used various groupings of 
demographic, criminal and psychological characteristics to predict the dichotomous outcomes of 
criminal recidivism. The nature of the dependent variable (post-release performance) indicates 
discrete dependent variable techniques are appropriate. However, although the outcomes of the 
dependent variable are discrete for each of the parolees, multinomial logit or probit models would 
fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable; that is, the severity of readmission to 
custody, if at all. Ordinary regression would err in the opposite direction such that the differences 
between, say, ‘PRP = 0’ and ‘PRP = 1’ (no readmission and parole violation), would be treated in 
the same manner as that between, say, ‘PRP = 1’ and ‘PRP = 2’ (parole violation and criminal 
recidivism), whereas in fact they are only a ranking. Accordingly, the following multinomial 
ordered probit model with simple heteroskedasticity is specified: 
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where εi is distributed normally with a mean of zero and Var(εi) equals wi2. This model comprises a 
form of censoring. The μs are unknown parameters to be estimated with β. The coefficients imputed 
by the multinomial ordered probit provide inferences about the effects of the explanatory variables 
on the probability of the three possible outcomes for post release performance. 
III. SPECIFICATION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The first set of explanatory variables used to predict parolee post-release performance relates to 
individual socio-economic characteristics. Selected descriptive statistics (for quantitative variables 
only) are detailed in Table 1. The first variable specified is a qualitative variable indicating whether 
the parolee is from an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander background (ABTS) (148 cases or 23.87 
percent of the sample). There is generally strong evidence to suggest that minority status is an 
important ingredient of post-release failure vis-à-vis readmittance to custody (Walker 1989; 
Mukherjee 1999; Benda and Tollett 1999). For example, Edwards (1998) used a table of risk 
indices to suggest that Aborigines had a 78 percent greater likelihood of re-offending than parolees 
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of other ethnic backgrounds. Similarly, Sickles’ et al. (1979) and Schmidt and Witte’s (1989) 
studies of criminal recidivism in North Carolina found that non-whites were more likely to re-
offend following release. However, Bodman and Maultby (1997, p. 895) concluded that the variable 
“…representing the percentage of the population that is Aboriginal or Torres-Strait Islander, is not 
significant in explaining the variation in all four categories of property crime” and Withers (1986, p. 
181) found that “…the Aboriginal population share produces a negative and statistically significant 
sign [when specified as a regressor for per capita crime rates]”. Nevertheless, since both these 
studies were based on aggregated data, a positive sign is hypothesised when post-release 
performance is regressed against ethnic background. 
The second socio-economic variable specified is each parolee’s age at time of most recent 
incarceration (AGE). It is generally acknowledged that inmates in higher age brackets are less likely 
to re-offend or breach parole. For instance, Schmidt and Witte (1989) included age as an 
explanatory variable in their study. From their estimated equations, age was found to be the most 
significant variable.  The ex ante sign on AGE is negative.  
The next two variables relate to additional socio-economic dimensions: namely, the number of 
years in education (EDU) and a qualitative variable indicating employment status at time of 
incarceration (EMP) (206 cases or 33.23 percent of the sample). The a priori hypothesis in both 
instances is that better-educated inmates and/or those who possess current labour skills have greater 
employment opportunities and are less likely to re-offend. This would imply a lower likelihood of 
post-release failure and negative ex ante coefficients are hypothesised. The inclusion of these 
variables is a logical extension of Becker’s (1968) costs and benefits of criminal behaviour to 
recidivist outcomes. More recent studies in this area include Piehl and DiIulio (1995) and Caulkins 
et al. (1996).  
The final two socio-economic variables specified in the analysis relate to each parolees’ family-
based characteristics. These are the number of children on admission to custody (CHL) and the 
parolee’s marital status (MRT) (including de facto) (Sickles et al., 1979). To start with, it is 
generally posited that those inmates who are in existing marital relationships and/or have children 
tend to exhibit a lower rate of recidivism than parolees who are single and without children. Both 
variables are therefore usually included as proxy measures of domestic stability and responsibility. 
The sign on both coefficients is thought to be positive. An alternative is that the need to provide 
financial support for families may place additional pressure on parolees, though this ‘provider-role’ 
may be less important where welfare payments are available and the gap between this and 
employment income is negligible. No particular a priori sign is hypothesised when post-release 
performance is regressed against the number of children. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
The second set of explanatory variables used to identify post-release performance relates to each 
parolee’s actual custodial characteristics. The first five characteristic variables have positive 
relationships with post-release performance. These are: (i) the number of previous episodes in 
custody (PRV); (ii) the length of sentence of the most recent custodial episode (SNT); (iii) the 
number of prisons in which this custodial episode was served (NOP); (iv) the total number of prison 
violations during the current sentence (VIO); and (v) whether the prison of release was ‘open’ or 
‘secure’ (medium or high security) (SEC) (442 cases or 71.29 percent of inmates were in medium-
level security or higher). The basic hypothesis for PRV, SNT, NOP, VIO and SEC is that inmates 
with more previous and more severe convictions, a greater propensity to commit violations whilst in 
custody, and an unstable reform environment as indicated by frequent relocation, are a high risk 
group in terms of parole violation and/or recidivism. Doren (1998), for example, found that the 
number of previous convictions was the most useful factor in determining the ‘true’ recidivist base 
rate for sex offences, and Dembo et al. (1995) linked patterns of previous arrest and custody with 
potential vocational, leisure and family problems with similar findings. Caulkins et al. (1996) also 
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established that the number of previous convictions in a number of categories, along with a 
prisoner’s custody classification, was instrumental in predicting recidivism. Some additional 
explanation may be found in the preparation for release by lower security institutions and the fact 
that inmates in open custody have shown themselves to be more suited to re-integration, having 
gained a lower security level.  
Conversely, Brennan and Mednick (1994) in a study of recidivism in a Danish birth cohort found 
that rates of future arrest were negatively related to the severity, frequency and variety of sanctions, 
though discontinuation of punishment generally resulted in recovery in criminal arrests. Lastly, 
Lewis (1986) argued that the general deterrent effect of longer sentences might be difficult to 
quantify, especially given the confounding of the hypothesised deterrent and incapacitation effects. 
One final qualification is that it is unlikely that higher risk inmates (those with longer sentences 
and/or security classifications) would be granted parole. This would suggest that parolees usually 
possess a lower risk profile (in terms of recidivism) than the overall prison population. Regardless, 
and in common with the large majority of previous studies, positive coefficients are hypothesised 
when reoccurrence of criminal activity is regressed against measures of previous criminal activity 
and severity. 
The final two custodial characteristics indicate whether an inmate was employed in service and/or 
revenue-producing work while in custody (OCC) (228 inmates or 36.77 percent of the sample 
recorded a prison occupation) and the parole sentence (in years) given by the court (PAR). In the 
first instance, a number of studies have indicated that prison work is an important contributor to 
criminal reform (Leiber and Mawhorr, 1995). And in the second, Caulkins et al. (1996) and 
Edwards (1998), amongst others, have found that the likelihood of criminal recidivism falls as the 
parole period increases. One consideration is that offenders must regularly report to a community 
corrections officer and may be required to attend specific programs or undergo drug testing during 
the parole period. The ex ante sign on both OCC and PAR is thought to be negative. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the parameters detailed above are presented in 
Table 2. Care must be taken in interpreting estimated coefficients in this model. While a positive 
(negative) coefficient would indicate a shift in probability to the right-most (left-most) cell, the 
impact on the middle cell is ambiguous and depends on the particular density functions. 
Nevertheless, some comment can be made on the levels of significance of the probability density 
shifts, and the limitations discussed earlier can be countered by the calculation of marginal effects 
(Greene, 1997). Also included in Table 2 are statistics for joint hypothesis and likelihood ratio tests, 
and the results of a prediction success table for the dependent variable. Four separate models are 
estimated. The estimated coefficients and standard errors employing the entire vector of socio-
economic and custodial characteristics are shown in Table 1 columns 1 and 2. The results of 
estimations using first, the set of socio-economic variables and then the set of custodial 
characteristics alone, are detailed in columns 3 and 4 and 5 and 6  
The estimated models are highly significant, with likelihood ratio tests of the hypothesis that all of 
the slope coefficients are zero rejected at the .01 level using the chi-square statistic. The percentage 
of observations predicted correctly on the basis of the given vector of socio-economic variables 
varies from over 60 percent for the overall specification (including both custodial and socio-
economic characteristics), to just under 58 percent for the socioeconomic characteristics alone. The 
results also appear sensible in terms of both the precision of the estimates and the signs on the 
coefficients. In the full specification, the estimated coefficients for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander background (ABTS), marital status (MRT), the number of children (CHL), and the number 
of prisons (NOP) and prison violations (VIO) during the most recent custodial episode are 
significant and conform with a priori expectations. These results are consistent with the estimated 
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coefficients in the second regression where only the set of socio-economic characteristics are 
included, though the coefficient on AGE is significantly negative. This would suggest that older 
parolees have a lesser likelihood of readmittance to prison through either parole violations or further 
criminal activity. The sign on educational level (EDU) is consistent with a priori expectations, 
though insignificant, and previous employment status (EMP) is neither significant nor consistent 
with the hypothesis of current labour market skills reducing the likelihood of recidivism.  
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
Finally, the model is re-estimated with only the set of custodial characteristics. The estimated 
coefficients and standard errors of this regression are detailed in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2. In 
addition to the levels of significance found in the original specification, the number of previous 
episode in custody (PRV) is significant and positive indicating that a history of incarceration is 
associated with an increased likelihood of recidivist behaviour. Schmidt and Witte (1984) likewise 
found that the likelihood of reconviction is found to vary significantly with the number of previous 
convictions. However, the coefficients on the length of sentence (SNT), the security level of the 
prison of release (SEC), whether the prisoner had an occupation (OCC) during the most recent 
period of custody, and the length of the parole period (PAR) are not significant. Log-likelihood tests 
are employed to reject the null hypotheses that the model of criminal recidivism could be estimated 
on the basis of the nested ‘no custodial effect’ and ‘no socio-economic effect’ models, and we may 
conclude that recidivism and parole violation are a function of both custodial and socio-economic 
characteristics.  
In order to further refine the overall specification, Wald and LR tests were used to test combinations 
of coefficients for joint significance and on this basis the variables for EMP, SNT and SEC were 
excluded from the final specification [W = 0.87 ∼ χ2(3)]. Each of the remaining variables were tested 
in a similar manner, though they failed to be excluded from the final specification [W = 26.02 ~ 
χ2(5)]. The refined model is presented in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2. The likelihood ratio for the 
refined model is compared with the critical χ2 value at the 5 percent level of significance and 10 
degrees of freedom of 18.3070. At the 5 percent level of significance, the explanatory variables as a 
group can be used to investigate the post-release performance of inmates from Queensland prisons.  
The most important determinants of post-release performance in terms of significance are the 
number of violations in prison during the current sentence (VIO), the number of prisons during the 
current episode (NOP), ethnic background (ABTS), marital status (MRT) and the number of children 
(CHL). The results indicate that there is a higher probability that inmates with greater number of 
violations and prisons during their current sentence or of Aboriginal ethnic background or with 
large families will re-offend, while married inmates will have a lower probability of re-offending. 
This result is consistent with the model of Sickles (1979) where the explanatory variables an 
individual with a serious problem with alcohol, martial status, minority status and age were most 
significant in explaining criminal recidivism.  Schmidt (1989) and Caulkin (1996) also included 
variables relating to alcohol or drug-related problems in their analyses, and these explanatory 
variables were found to be highly significant. A limitation of this model for the prediction of post-
release performance of Queensland inmates is the lack of data on these socio-economic factors. 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
To facilitate further comparability, marginal effects are calculated. These indicate the marginal 
effect of each outcome on the probability of post release performance (ranked from 0 to 2, with 2 
being the worst offence). These are presented in Table 3. In order to provide the marginal effects for 
the continuous variables, the standard normal density function is used. Note that the marginal 
effects sum to zero; this follows from the requirement that the probabilities add to one. However, 
this approach is not appropriate for evaluating the marginal effects of dummy variables. In this case, 
a dummy variable is analysed by comparing the probabilities that result when the variable takes it’s 
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two different values with those that occur with the other variables held at their sample means 
(Greene, 1997).  
Using these marginal effects, it appears that ethnic background (ABTS), the number of children 
(CHL), the number of prisons during current episode (NOP) and the number of violations in prison 
during the current sentence (VIO) have the greatest positive impact on the offence of violating or 
breaching conditions of parole and re-admitted to custody (PRP = 1) with a negative impact on the 
post-release performance of neither breaching parole nor re-offending during the observation period 
(PRP = 0). The negative impact of marital status is concentrated in the offence of violating or 
breaching conditions of parole and re-admitted to custody (PRP = 1) with a positive impact on 
inmates who have neither breached parole nor re-offended during the observation period (PRP = 0). 
Likewise, AGE, EDU, prison occupation during sentence (OCC) and the length of time served on 
the parole period (PAR) have the greatest negative impact on the offence of violating or breaching 
conditions of parole and re-admittance to custody (PRP = 1) with positive impacts on the outcome 
of neither breaching parole nor re-offending during the observation period (PRP = 0). The number 
of previous episodes in custody (PRV) has a positive impact on the offence of violating or breaching 
conditions of parole and re-admitted to custody (PRP = 1) with a negative impact on inmates who 
have neither breached parole nor re-offended during the observation period (PRP = 0). 
A number of points can be made. First, it would appear that primary influences on recidivism 
through criminal activity and/or parole violations include marital status and the number of children, 
the number of prisons resided in and the number of violations committed during the most recent 
period of custody, and aboriginal background. Of these variables, the most significant marginal 
effects on a return to criminal activity occur where the parolee is from an Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander background, the number of prisons held in the most recent episode of custody, and 
the number of violations committed during this custody. Second, the influence of the custodial and 
socio-economic characteristics of paroled prisoners varies across readmittance to custody through 
parole violations and readmittance through a return to criminal activity. In fact, the marginal effect 
of all the custodial and socio-economic variables are higher for readmittance to prison through 
parole violation, than through further criminal activity.  
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
Finally, the ability of the model to accurately predict outcomes in paroled prisoners also varies 
across the measures of post-release performance. Table 4 contains the predicted and observed 
results. For example, of the 360 paroled prisoners who neither re-offended nor breached parole, the 
final model specification predicted 337 cases (93.6%) correctly, and identified 19 parolees (5.3%) 
as parole violators, and 4 (1.1%) as recidivists (at least during the observation period). 
Alternatively, when used to predict the post-release outcome of parole violation, 35 (19.1%) 
instances were correctly identified, 13 (7.1%) predicted as re-offenders and more than 135 (73.8%) 
as neither re-offenders nor parole violators. Lastly, the model correctly predicted only 5 (6.5%) 
parolees as re-offenders, with 21 (27.3%) as parole violators and 51 (66.2%) as parolees who 
neither breached parole nor re-offended in the observation period. These findings would suggest 
that the model of criminal recidivism employed might be more useful in identifying non-offenders 
and parole violators than the perpetrators of future criminal acts. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present study uses a multinomial ordered probit model to investigate the custodial and socio-
economic determinants of criminal recidivism and parole violations in 620 Queensland prisoners. 
The current paper extends empirical work in this area in at least two ways. First, and as far as the 
authors are aware, it represents the first attempt to apply qualitative statistical models of recidivism 
in Australia. The evidence provided suggests that recidivism is a function (at least in the context of 
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models of this type) of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander background, marital and family status, 
and the number of prisons held in and the number of violations committed in the most recent 
episode of custody.  
Second, the study analyses in detail the varying influences of custodial and socio-economic 
characteristics. The results indicate that custodial characteristics, whilst in themselves useful 
indicators of post-release performance, may be supplemented by socio-economic factors. Further, 
the influence of these factors varies across the different measures of post-release performance, 
whether defined in terms of parole violations the more serious outcome of a return to criminal 
activity. Unfortunately, from a policy perspective the results do more to identify likely reoffenders, 
than to present possible ways to reduce the criminal activity of paroled prisoners (prison industry 
programs, longer parole periods, less frequent relocation of prisoners, etc.). 
Of course, the study does suffer a number of limitations, all of which suggest directions for future 
research. To start with, and following Avio (1998: 156), “one can conclude that there is value in 
using sophisticated models in predicting recidivism for random samples of released offenders, but 
that the models are not yet sufficiently refined for application to individuals”. Put differently, while 
the results of the study are suggestive of policy changes, they are not sufficiently developed to 
provide an empirically feasible guide to parole boards, let alone Avio’s (1998) ‘selective 
incapacitation’ (where predictions of future behaviour of individual convicted offenders are used to 
set sentences and parole periods). This is particularly relevant in that Miceli’s (1994) ‘efficient 
punishment system’ typically requires a period of punishment followed by supervised release, and 
this socially optimal punishment system is often demonstrated to vary across individuals. While 
some promising advances have been made in the use of neural network models to predict criminal 
recidivism in this regard, these have not yet been shown to exhibit any advantage over well-known 
statistical methods (Caulkins et al., 1996).  
A second limitation is that the data used contains no information concerning post-release controls 
and other contemporaneous regressors. These could include information on whether the individual 
worked during the observation period, the length of time to attain employment after release, and 
earnings from this employment. Equally, it is likely that the explanatory variables for recidivist 
outcomes are likely to vary across time; that is, in terms of post-release ‘survival time’ (the length 
of time from release to recidivism). Schmidt and Witte (1989), for example, used a hazard model to 
link the time since prisoner release and differences in exposure to the risk of recidivism. It is argued 
that “not only is this variable of interest in itself, but ignoring information on length of time to 
recidivism (however defined) is statistically inefficient” (Avio, 1998, p. 155). Unfortunately, the 
data does not include information on the time between release and readmittance to custody (through 
either parole violation of re-offending).  
A third limitation is that studies of recidivism need to incorporate more fully the economic model of 
crime. For example, given that post-release performance in the present study is defined very 
broadly, much more needs to be done in examining the seriousness and type of criminal activity, the 
degree of certainty and severity of punishment for these crimes, and the legitimate and illegitimate 
opportunities available to paroled prisoners. This would more closely adhere to Becker’s (1968, p. 
176) seminal argument that “a person commits an offence if the expected utility to him exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities”. Regrettably, detailed 
information of this type was not available.     
Finally, there is the persistent problem of simultaneity in studies of criminal recidivism. That is, 
there is reason to believe that an individual’s decision to engage in criminal activity can affect at 
least some of the more frequently specified explanatory variables. For example, Sickles et al. 
(1979) provide an early simultaneous analysis of parolee’s wages rates and the time sentenced (as a 
proxy for the severity of the offence). It is also likely that exogeneity is likely to be questioned for 
other variables such as marital status, the number of children, employment and education. However, 
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this problem may not be as severe as initially thought, at least in part. For example, Sickles et al. 
(1979, p. 171) found that “the relationship between the criminal activity level and legitimate 
opportunities may be recursive (legitimate opportunity affects the level of criminal activity, but not 
the reverse), rather than simultaneous”. Nonetheless, the problem of accurately measuring the set of 
explanatory variables and then specifying these variables in an appropriate model presents an 
ongoing challenge.  
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